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WELCOME TO THE PARTY:  
CREATING A RESPONSIBLE THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE  






Third-party litigation financing has the potential to address blind 
spots in the American civil litigation landscape and improve the system as 
a whole.  Traditional litigation financing arrangements have left many 
Americans out in the cold, lacking the proverbial “key to the courthouse.”  
A rethinking of the current litigation financing system can offer more 
Americans with meritorious, winnable claims the ability to pursue their 
claims; this change has the potential to substantially increase equal access 
to the courts for the average person and further public interests. 
 The term “third-party litigation financing” simply refers to a 
situation in which capital to pursue a lawsuit is provided by a party that 
otherwise has no connection to the case (not the party or his counsel).1  In 
exchange for an advance of funds to pursue a claim, the financier charges 
interest on the advance if the plaintiff recovers.  There are several kinds of 
third-party litigation financing including corporate, consumer, claim, and 
defense.2 This Article focuses on consumer claim financing, meaning an 
individual plaintiff (as opposed to a corporation) who secures funding from 
a third party to litigate a claim. 
 Third-party litigation financing is a relatively new addition to 
American litigation and has not been without its critics.  The predominant 
criticisms are that plaintiffs may end up with a smaller piece of the pie and 
that third-party financiers of litigation may take advantage of 
unsophisticated clients in what amounts to predatory lending in the form of 
high interest rates.3  These issues, however, can be addressed and remedied 
 
  * Christopher Mendez is a 2021 graduate of Mississippi College School of 
Law. 
  1. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of 
Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56-57 
(2004). 
  2. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation 
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1271 (2010-2011). 
  3. Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding 
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 896 (2014). 
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by a scheme of commonsense state regulations aimed at protecting 
consumers of litigation financing. 
 This Article’s intended audience includes state legislators and state 
agencies, as they have the power to implement the changes proposed here, 
as well as practicing attorneys, who may find the proposed changes 
provocative, but hopefully stimulating as well.  Additionally, the general 
public may benefit from rethinking their relationship with the legal field; 
anyone could be a plaintiff at some point, and third-party litigation 
financing can empower the average plaintiff to take control of, or pursue at 
all, his meritorious claim. 
 The arguments laid out below have two main purposes: (1) to 
illustrate the positive role third-party litigation financing can play in the 
American legal system, and (2) to explain how states can create a structure 
that will allow the industry to increase access to civil justice and create more 
options without disadvantaging plaintiffs. 
Section II of this Article provides a background on the history of 
third-party litigation financing and how agreements are typically structured.  
In Section III, the benefits of incorporating a third-party litigation financing 
are explored, focusing on the potential for increasing access for plaintiffs.  
Section IV specifically explores the benefits of third-party financing as 
compared with the most common form of litigation financing – the 
contingency fee.  A proposal for how third-party litigation financing should 
be generally regulated to protect consumers is laid out in Section V. 
Though seemingly dramatic, these proposed additions to the civil 
litigation sphere need not be frightening, and the great potential for 
increased equal access and fairness to the civil justice system can perhaps 




A. What is Third-Party Litigation Financing? 
 
Third-party litigation financing is the process by which a litigant 
secures funding from an outside party with no other interest in the litigation.  
In the case of plaintiff claim litigation financing, a plaintiff will secure 
funds from a lawsuit funding company.4  The capital is advanced to the 
plaintiff on a non-recourse basis meaning that if the plaintiff does not have 
a favorable outcome, he does not need to repay the loan.5  If the plaintiff 
does prevail, in exchange for the advance of capital, the funding company 
 
  4. Jayme Herschkopf, Third-Party Litigation Finance, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER POCKET GUIDE SERIES 1 (2017). 
  5. Id. 
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will take a cut of the plaintiff's recovery to repay the loan with interest.6  
The amount of interest due typically increases depending on how long the 
claim takes to resolve.7  In short, litigation finance companies are investors 
in the outcome of the plaintiff's case. 
The role of third-party litigation financing runs parallel to the role 
of the contingency fee agreement.8  Both are intended to allow a plaintiff, 
otherwise unable to hire an attorney based on hourly rates, to gain better 
access to the courts.9  Before the advent of the contingency, both sides of a 
civil case would simply pay a lawyer an hourly rate for his services.10  This 
system greatly advantaged the rich over those in the middle and poorest 
classes as they had the capital to invest in their own legal redress.11  As the 
price of legal fees rose, more in the middle class were unable to pursue their 
claims.12  Contingency fees, first widely used at the beginning of the 20th 
Century, were a solution to this problem.13  Third-party litigation financing 
also seeks to address this issue; the advancing of funds (by a third party) 
allows those in the middle and poorer classes, who are unable to hire a 
lawyer on an hourly basis, to pursue their claims. 
 
B. History of Third-Party Litigation Funding & Historical Prohibition 
 
As the new kid on the block (compared to contingency fees), 
opponents of third-party litigation financing frequently turn to an historical 
argument to attack the practice:  the ancient concept of champerty.  
Champerty is an agreement that divides the proceeds of litigation between 
the owner of the claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit (who helps to 
support the claim).14  Champerty has traditionally been disallowed in the 
 
  6. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 401 (Colo. 2015). 
  7. Id. 
  8. Contingency Fees are explained in Section V of this Article. 
  9. This Article focuses on plaintiffs who want to acquire representation or who 
would not pursue a claim in the absence of counsel.  A plaintiff can always pursue a 
claim pro se, however statistical analysis of outcomes show that a represented plaintiff 
has much greater favorable outcomes than unrepresented ones, especially when the 
defendant is represented, and the plaintiff is not.  For a detailed analysis on litigation 
outcomes see Shauna Strickland, Scott Graces, & Richard Schauffler, Virginia Self-
Represented Litigant Study: Outcomes of Civil Cases in General District Court, Juvenile 
& Domestic Relations Court, and Circuit Court, National Center for State Courts (2017). 
10. Phillip J Havers, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the 
Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'Y 621 (2000). 
11. Id. at 622 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1286. 
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United States, but its roots are of ancient Europe.15  The prohibition on 
champerty grew out of situations in which less wealthy land owners would 
convey their property to much wealthier land owners in order to combat 
others' claims to the land (a powerful outsider trying to take the land of the 
smaller landowner).16  Once conveyed, the wealthier man would 
overwhelm the courts and secure a victory for the less wealthy man, while 
taking a piece of the property for himself.17  The practice was abused and 
allowed wealthy lords to acquire even more land and influence.18 
Champerty laws are quite inconsistent among the states.  Some 
states including Arizona, California, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Texas 
permit champerty or do not see third-party litigation financing as 
champerty.19 While in other states, including Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania, champerty 
prohibition is alive and well, and third-party financing can be found as a 
violation; a defendant can invoke the champerty law, and litigation will 
come to a stop.20 
In 20th Century America, champerty laws had a revival in southern 
states as a means of stifling civil rights litigation.21  Civil rights claims 
following the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision often 
had civil rights organizations attached as amicus curiae.22  Champerty laws 
were strengthened and invoked to stymie such suits and limit civil rights 
litigation.23 
From champerty's outdated purposes to its modern misuse, it can be 
argued that the doctrine is somewhat obsolete.  The inconsistent application 
of champerty among the states points to the need for updating.  Champerty, 
one of the main historical arguments against third-party litigation financing, 
is an archaic concept that should be weakened or removed from the 
American civil litigation sphere.  This would help clear the road for a 
responsible third-party litigation financing industry to develop consistently 
across the states.  Once there is a consistent rejection of champerty laws (or 
at least exceptions built in for consumers of third-party litigation financing), 
 
15. Id. at 1287. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Earl W. Mah & Charlene Morrow, United States: A Strategic Look At 
Champerty And Third-Party Litigation Financing, MONDAQ (Jan. 24, 2019),  
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/774162/Patent/A+Strategic+ 
Look+at+Champerty+and+ThirdParty+Litigation+Financing. 
19. Id.  
20. Id.  
21. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1287. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
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third-party litigation financing can be used to empower plaintiffs by 
increasing their options in pursuing their cases. 
 
C. Features of a Third-Party Litigation Financing Agreement 
 
 The agreement between the plaintiff and his third-party financier 
includes that the advance is a nonrecourse loan.24  This means that if the 
plaintiff loses, he does not need to repay the loan or any interest.25  
Additionally, if the plaintiff does win, but his proceeds do not exceed his 
loan plus interest, the plaintiff does not owe the deficit26; in other words, a 
debt cannot be created that is greater than judgment received by the 
plaintiff.  The loan agreements usually include a sliding scale of interest 
rates; the longer the claim takes to resolve, the higher the interest rate.27  
These rates will vary based on the financier and the nature of the case.  For 
the sake of illustration, a simple sliding interest rate schedule may look like 
this: 
Time from Issue of Loan 
to Resolution of Claim 
Interest 
Rate 
Time from Issue of Loan 
to Resolution of Claim 
Interest 
Rate 
0-3 Months 20% 12-18 Months 50% 
3-6 Months 30% 18-24 Months 80% 
6-12 Months 40% > 24 Months 100% 
 
Some finance companies do not use this sliding scale interest rate 
system and instead charge a monthly interest rate on the amount 
borrowed.28  This rate is usually in the neighborhood of 15% per month and 
non-compounding.29  In this type of arrangement, a plaintiff who borrowed 
$10,000, would accrue an additional $1,500 of interest for each month that 
passed before the claim was resolved.  This second type of arrangement 
may be beneficial for a plaintiff whose case is very quick to resolve, but the 
potential for ballooning interest raises concerns.  For instance, a plaintiff 
who borrowed $10,000 on a 15% per month basis would owe the financier 
 
24.. John L. Ropiequet, Current Issues in Consumer Litigation Funding, 33 No. 
9 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 17 (2014). 
25. Id. 
26. Id.  
27. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 401 (Colo. 2015). 
28. Misty L. Sheffield, What You should Know About Litigation Lending, 
Atlanta Paralegal Services (June 5, 2012).  
29. Id.  
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$28,000 ($10,000 principal and $18,000 in interest) if the case took 12 
months to resolve – a whopping 180% interest.  Because the monthly 
interest rate model has the potential to overwhelm plaintiffs with exorbitant 
interest, the proposed regulations below advocate for a sliding scale 
agreement instead. 
 
III. BENEFITS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING 
 
A.   Increasing Equal Access to Justice & Furthering Public Interests 
 
As state above, the acceptance of third-party litigation financing 
allows more middle class and less advantaged Americans to engage in civil 
litigation and seek redress for wrong perpetrated against them.  It is worth 
exploring how third-party financing can increase access for plaintiffs who 
cannot afford to pay a lawyer on an hourly basis. 
There is little doubt that all Americans do not share equal access to 
the civil justice system.  With the need for legal representation seemingly 
ever expanding, it is essential that more people get the legal assistance they 
need.  Everything from filing a claim under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, to filing an employment discrimination claim, to product liability 
claims, and many other claims30 benefit from the services of an attorney.31  
Women, minorities, immigrants, the elderly, and the impoverished are more 
likely to require legal assistance.32 
While Americans are entitled to legal representation in criminal 
prosecutions against them, there is no such entitlement for civil cases.33  
States and the federal government have tried to fill the gap between the need 
for civil representation and the representation available.  For instance, in 
1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to help low 
income individuals who need civil legal aid.34  The LSC estimates that 71% 
of low income households experienced at least one civil legal problem in 
the year 2017; of those households, the LSC estimates that 86% received 
inadequate or no legal help.35  Some states have also implemented programs 
 
30. Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-
justice/reports/2016/12/08/294479/making-justice-equal/. 
31. See supra Note 9 and accompanying text.  This Article is predicated on the 
concept that plaintiffs who are represented fair better than plaintiffs who are not. 
32. Id.  
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
34. Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 31, at 7.  
35. LEGAL SERV. CO., Justice Gap Report, LEGAL SERV. CO.: MEDIA 
CTR,  https://www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2017-justice-gap-report.  
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by which low-income or disadvantaged individuals can apply for grants to 
address their civil legal needs.36 
While these government programs help to address the issue of 
inadequate civil litigation access, they are quite imperfect.  For instance, 
they may only be available to a certain category of people, such as those 
living in poverty; for people outside the category, assistance may be 
unavailable.  The risk of pursuing litigation on an hourly rate basis is a risk 
for any plaintiff as an unfavorable outcome will result in the accumulation 
of legal fees.  This risk has a vast deterrent effect on potential plaintiffs, 
even those who may be able to afford the legal fees.37 
The most typical way for plaintiffs to shift the risk of litigation away 
from themselves is by entering into a contingency fee scheme with their 
attorney.  If the plaintiff is victorious, the attorney will take a healthy piece 
of the proceeds, but the client is not required to pay attorney’s fees up front.  
This is a routine and well-established method for helping a client get his 
“key to the courthouse,” but it, too, is not without its flaws.38  One classic 
issue with contingency fees is the motivation of the attorney.  It often makes 
more financial sense for counsel to settle cases early; this guarantees 
income for the attorney and doesn’t require substantial expense of time and 
resources on the attorney’s part.39  Once the risk shifts to the attorney, he 
may be much less conservative in his demands.  Contingency fees and their 
relative function to third-party litigation financing are fully addressed in 
more detail in Section IV of this Article. 
Third-party litigation financing offers an arrangement in which 
neither the plaintiff nor his counsel is bearing the risk of litigation.  This 
will ease the burden on the parties who have an immediate interest in the 
suit.  Attorneys will be free to approach the case in the way they feel is best 
without having to worry about the economics of each case.  The plaintiff 
will suffer less financial and emotional stress knowing that he has the 
resources to pursue his meritorious claim.40  Further, the plaintiff may be 
able to secure better or more adequate counsel, increasing his likelihood of 






36. See generally Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 31, at 7.  
37. Id. 
38. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1293. 
39. Id. at 1301. 
40. Id.  
41. Id. at 1299. 
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B.  Benefits of Increasing Access to Civil Courts 
 
In the micro, the benefit of access to civil justice has a clear benefit 
for plaintiffs with meritorious claims – they will able to utilize the legal 
system to realize their deserved remedy.  With risk diverted to a third party, 
more claims can be pursued and more justice served via civil courts. 
Beyond simply gaining access, third-party litigation financing 
offers an opportunity to advance the fairness and sophistication of civil 
litigation. In his work, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, Marc Galanter explores the outcomes in 
civil litigation between “haves” (people with resources) and “have-nots” 
(people without resources).42  Perhaps “big guy” and “little guy” are better 
names for the purpose of this article.  Often the plaintiff in a civil case is 
the little guy; an individual with little experience in civil litigation and 
limited resources.43  The defendant is often the big guy, perhaps a 
corporation.  The big guy has plenty of experience with civil litigation, as 
he has been a defendant many times before; he is a repeat player in the game 
of civil litigation.44  He also has vast resources to allow him to pursue his 
defense to the end. 
The disparity in experience and resources creates an advantage for 
the big guy.45  He can pressure the little guy to take quick settlements as he 
knows the little guy fears being able to afford an extended litigation 
process.46  Third-party litigation financing offers a chance to rebalance the 
scales in favor of the little guy.  If defendants know that the plaintiff is 
backed by a financier, they will be more likely to offer a fair settlement 
rather than intimidate the plaintiff into taking an inequitable one.47  Further, 
the plaintiff may be able to see the claim through to a trial and recover a 
more equitable amount. 
As litigation financing companies gain more experience via funding 
with plaintiffs, they will become repeat players and the advantage of big 
guy defendants will be diminished.48  Greater balance in civil justice will 
result. 
In the macro, increased access to pursue meritorious claims will 
help to advance the public interest.  Private litigation is essential to the 
 
42. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: 





47. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1304. 
48. Id. at 1305. 
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progress of public interest changes.49  Litigation can be a tool to punish or 
persuade the private sector into making changes that benefit the public as a 
whole.50  That litigation and change can then be used to help governments 
develop statutes and regulations that further public interests.51 
An example to illustrate: a large company manufactures a product.  
A consumer is harmed by that product and files suit with the help of a 
lawyer.52  The consumer wins and is awarded punitive damages.  This may 
encourage other consumers to file similar suits. The corporation is likely to 
make changes to the product design to prevent further injury to consumers 
and avoid paying future awards or settlements.  Further, governmental 
agencies will be alerted to potential issues with products or manufacturers 
and implement regulations to protect the public.   As discussed above, third-
party litigation financing has the potential to increase access to pursue 
meritorious claims.  More claims equate to more, and likely faster, 
advancement of issues that are in the interest of the public.  This scenario, 
though simple, demonstrates how litigation can spark private and 
governmental progress toward addressing issues of public interest. 
One argument made by opponents of third-party litigation financing 
is the potential for a landslide of meritless claims being filed, adding to the 
lengthy logjams that exist in many court systems.53  This is a point used by 
the critics of contingency fees as well.54  However, third-party litigation 
financing actually has the potential to decrease frivolous suits as compared 
to the contingency fee scheme.   
By injecting a third-party into the litigation process, the likelihood 
of a meritless claim being forwarded is likely not increased.  This is because 
third-party financing creates a shifting of risk, not an elimination of risk.55  
Litigation finance companies make an investment in the plaintiff's case.  
Accordingly, they are unlikely to invest in a claim that is frivolous as they 
will be the party incurring the loss if the plaintiff loses.  Another set of eyes 
(or many added sets of eyes) may have the effect of filtering out meritless 
claims.  Rather than relying on the judgement of a single lawyer or firm, 
the judgement of the financier is utilized and meritless claims can be 
stopped before they start. 
Plaintiffs (and even attorneys) may have great emotional 
investments in their cases.  Plaintiffs may feel personally wronged despite 
 
49. See Jason M. Wilson, Comment, Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, 
64 AM. U.L. REV. 385 (2014). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Thus, likely improving the plaintiff's chances of winning.  
53. Herschkopf, supra note 4, at 1. 
54. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1293. 
55. Id. at 1314. 
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having a claim with no legal merit.  Attorneys may lose sight of the claim's 
merits because they focus intensely on being a good advocate for the client 
rather than analyzing the winnability of the case.  The injection of a third-
party can cool the burning emotions that may be associated with lawsuits.  
In this way, the number of meritless claims is not likely to increase. 
Increased access to the civil justice system for the average American 
is the greatest asset and potential for third-party litigation financing.  
Currently, there are millions of Americans lacking access and financing can 
be their key to admittance.  Third-party litigation financing, more than any 
other method, has the greatest potential to quickly and efficiently boost 
access for the average citizen with a meritorious claim. 
 
C. An Illustrative Vignette: Giving More Access to Poor Plaintiffs 
 
 Paige Plaintiff worked as a factory worker at BrandCo, an 
international conglomerate that manufactures and sells thousands of items.  
Paige worked for BrandCo for four years.  BrandCo employs thousands of 
people across their American operation.  One day, Paige's boss, Barney 
Boss, approached Paige during lunch and told her she was fired.  Shocked 
and upset, Paige asked Barney what she had done to get fired.  Barney 
responded, "Nothing, you didn't do anything wrong.  I want to hire a man 
to do your job; the department has too many women – it's not macho 
enough." 
 Paige tried to find work for months but was unsuccessful.  
Reflecting on getting fired, Paige thought it was unfair that she lost her job 
simply because she was a woman.  She thought that there must be a law 
against firing someone based on their sex.56  Paige called Lisa Lawyer and 
explained her situation.  Lisa told Paige that she could probably sue 
BrandCo for employment discrimination.  Paige said she would like to do 
so and, having never hired a lawyer before, wanted to know how it all 
worked. 
 Lisa explained that her hourly rate was $200 per hour, she expected 
to spend 100 hours working on the case, and that she would need a $5,000 
retainer to start working on Paige's case.  Paige explained that she had been 
out of work since she was fired and that she was having trouble making 
ends meet as it was; she didn't have $5,000 nor could she confidently say 
 
56. This vignette focuses on a sexual discrimination claim.  Under Title VII, a 
plaintiff must first file a complaint of sexual discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) – a governmental agency.  A claimant must wait (a 
maximum of 180 days) for the EEOC to give them permission to sue their employer.  In 
the interim, the EEOC may try to mediate the issue themselves before allowing the 
plaintiff to sue.   
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that she would be able to pay Lisa's hourly rate (an estimated $20,000) if 
she lost the case.  Paige decided it was too risky for her to pursue her claim 
on an hourly rate basis. 
 Lisa, who has experience with employment discrimination, told 
Paige that for a claim like hers against a company as big as BrandCo, the 
maximum recovery she could receive was $300,000 including any 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Lisa felt that Paige had a very good 
claim as Lisa had won in a similar case against BrandCo just a few years 
before.  Lisa told Paige that if she couldn't afford to pay her hourly, a friend 
of hers, Angus Attorney, took cases on a contingency basis.  Lisa figured 
that Angus would be interested in Paige's case as there was enough meat on 
the bone for old Angus. 
 Paige visited with Angus to explain her situation.  Angus has 
litigated dozens of employment discrimination cases and concluded that, 
from his experience, Paige's case was not worth $300,000.  He explained 
that punitive damages are usually reserved for extremely egregious cases or 
cases in which the employer has a pattern of discrimination.  Angus 
estimated that Paige would be lucky to get $30,000 for her claim and it 
would probably come in the form of a settlement.  Further, Angus was not 
confident that he could even get a settlement, or win at trial for that matter, 
as BrandCo employed some of the best attorneys in the country.  “Sorry, 
lady.  I only take on slam dunk cases.  It's not worth the risk to me to take 
on your case, those BrandCo guys are tough.” 
 Unable to afford to pay Lisa an hourly rate, nor persuade Angus to 
take her case, Paige is without redress.  She became frustrated, hopeless, 
and disenfranchised.  Paige decided not to further pursue her claim.  Not 
only is this unfortunate and deleterious for Paige, but society as a whole is 
also injured because BrandCo's discrimination went unchecked. 
 If a third-party financier is injected into this scenario, the result can 
change dramatically.  Paige could reach out to a litigation finance company, 
TP Finance Company, and explain her situation after she has already 
spoken to Lisa.57  Instead of relying on one lawyer's experience with 
employment discrimination, TP has data on thousands of previous 
employment discrimination cases they have financed before.  TP 
determines that Paige has an 80% change of winning and that she will likely 
get the maximum ($300,000) as they have knowledge that BrandCo has a 
long and repeated history of not checking this kind of discrimination.  TP 
confers with Lisa and agrees that the case will only take 100 hours to 
resolve. 
 
57. Alternatively, Lisa may already have a relationship with TP Finance and 
refer her clients to them when a client with a meritorious, winnable claim. 
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 TP offers to advance Paige $40,000 ($20,000 to pay Lisa and 
$20,000 for living expenses while the case plays out).  TP estimates that the 
case will take 12 months to resolve and communicates this to Paige.  TP's 
agreement includes a 50% interest rate on the money it advanced to Paige 
in the event the case takes 12 months to resolve. 
 If Paige wins and receives the maximum judgement, Lisa will be 
paid her hourly rate as she expected.  TP will profit $20,000 via the interest 
charged on the loan.  Paige will receive the remainder of the settlement; this 
will be a net gain of $240,000,58, 59 plus Paige was able to live on her loan 
for 12 months while the case was resolved and have the lawyer of her choice 
rather than being limited to lawyers who work on a contingency basis. 
 Further, Paige's victory sends a message to BrandCo that it will be 
punished for its continued violation of discrimination law.  In addition, if 
many employees with similar experiences to Paige's are empowered to file 
suit thanks to the availability of third-party financing, BrandCo, or similarly 
situated companies, will be incentivized to better prevent discrimination.  
This serves the greater public interest of keeping the workplace free of 
discrimination. 
 If Paige does not win, the only loser is TP finance.  Lisa would still 
get paid her hourly rate.  Paige had the opportunity to pursue her claim 
(though the court ultimately decided it was not a winning claim) and paid 
her living expenses for 12 months.  TP finance would lose $40,000.  Why 
would a company be willing to take this risk when either a plaintiff or 
lawyer would not?  The answer is in the more advanced risk analysis that a 
financier, as an investor, is likely to complete. 
 If TP calculates that it has an 80% chance of winning a case like 
Paige's, the math makes the risk worth taking for the company.  Of ten cases 
similar to Paige's, the plaintiff will win eight times and lose two times.  On 
those two losses, TP will lose $80,00060 (assuming they advance the same 
amount of money to each similarly situated plaintiff).  On the eight winning 
cases, TP will profit $160,000.61  After ten cases, TP knows they will profit 
$80,000.  This makes it economically logical for TP to engage in business 
 
58. This does not factor in any other associated fees Paige would have to pay 
such as filing fees or similar costs not directly included in Lisa's hourly rate. 
59. Of the $300,000, Paige will repay TP $60,000 ($40,000 principal + $20,000 
in interest) and has paid Lisa $20,000.  Paige has also spent $20,000 on living expenses 
throughout the 12-month period.  Paige's entire income from the loan and the judgment 
are $340,000 ($40,000 loan + $300,000 judgment).  Therefore, Paige nets $240,000 
($340,000 [total income]- $60,000 [repaying the loan plus interest] - $20,000 [Lisa's 
wages] - $20,000 [living expenses] = $240,000).  
60. $40,000 x 2 losses = $80,000 
61. $20,000 of profit from interest x 8 wins = $160,000 
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as they become repeat players and can mitigate any losses.  This is luxury 
that a single plaintiff or attorney often cannot afford. 
 




In the current American legal industry, the contingency fee is a 
staple of litigation funding.  Contingency fees exist to ensure that people 
with meritorious claims, who would otherwise be unable to pay the costs of 
litigating a claim, gain access to counsel and the courts.62  This is in contrast 
to an hourly rate arrangement in which a client simply pays his lawyer on 
the basis of how many hours he works on the case.   
Without a contingency fee system, a power disparity between 
plaintiff and defendant could rob a plaintiff the chance to litigate and 
recover.63  For instance, this could happen in a case in which the plaintiff is 
just an individual and the defendant is a corporation.  Using an hourly 
arrangement, the corporation/defendant could bankrupt the plaintiff before 
the case is resolved, the plaintiff would stop pursing the case, and he would 
not receive justice nor be made whole.64 
A contingency fee agreement usually requires no money upfront 
flowing from the plaintiff to the lawyer.  Instead, the agreement promises 
to the lawyer a percentage of any judgement won by the plaintiff.  Those 
percentages vary, but typically they will be roughly one third for a pretrial 
settlement, forty percent for a claim that goes to trial, and as high as fifty 
percent if an appeal is needed.65  If the plaintiff loses, he will typically pay 
the lawyer nothing for his work, but may still be responsible for paying 
court costs, the cost of deposing witnesses, or similar costs that are not 
direct attorney labor fees.66 
Under a contingency fee system, the lawyer bears the brunt of the 
risk.  The plaintiff's risk is relatively minimal in that he will only need to 
pay some costs as stated above.  The lawyer risks receiving nothing for his 
work and also the opportunity cost of using that same time to pursue a case 
that would have made him money.  Because the risk rests upon the attorney, 
 
62. Phillip J Havers, Comment, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical 
Problems of the Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL'Y 621, 624 (2000). 
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 624-25. 
66. When You Need a Lawyer, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consum
ers/lawyerfees_contingent/ 
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he must be discerning about which cases to take.  Further, he makes up for 
this risk by requiring such a large piece of the pie when the plaintiff is 
successful. 
 
B. Common Criticisms of Contingency Fees 
 
Contingency fees are the norm for plaintiffs who cannot afford an 
hourly rate arrangement, but they are not without their critics.  The main 
criticism is that the contingency fee warps the attorney's motivations.67  It 
forces an attorney to think more about money, risks, and outcomes, rather 
than justice for his client.  This can lead to early, lower settlements or 
lawyers being so averse to risk that they only represent clients who have 
the most winnable, highest payoff claims.  This leaves other clients unable 
to secure representation.   
Additionally, the large percentage taken by attorneys brings into the 
conversation a discussion of fairness.  Plaintiffs may not fully understand 
that he will be giving such a great percentage of any judgment to his 
lawyer.68  Contingency fee agreements are often complicated and may 
separate costs from fees.  The result is that the attorney not only gets his 
agreed upon percentage, but also large amounts in the form of legal costs.  
An agreement with a typical one-third pre-trial settlement agreement may, 
in reality, end up entitling the attorney to half the settlement after legal costs 
are added.  The issue, of course, is that less money lands in the pockets of 
the plaintiff, who may be the victim of serious harm; this tarnishes the legal 
profession and likely contributes to the unsavory image of a personal injury 
lawyer held by many in the general public.69 
Another criticism of contingency fees is the potential for 
exploitation.70  A personal injury plaintiff may be in urgent need of 
assistance.  Lawyers are in the more powerful position in this situation as 
they have specialized knowledge the general public does not have.  This 
 
67. Phillip J. Havers, Take the Money and Run, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y, at 626. 
68. Id.  
69. In the most recent Gallup poll, Lawyers as a whole (not just personal injury 
lawyers) ranked in the bottom half of occupations in terms of people's rating of that 
occupation's honesty and ethical standards.  Only 22% of people responded that they 
thought lawyers had a high or very high ethical standard, while 28% responded that 
lawyers have a low or very low ethical standard.  This poll is sometimes used to rank the 
most and least trusted professions in the country.  Lawyers consistently land just above 
members of Congress, business executives, and used car salesmen.  The poll can be 
accessed at Gallup, Honesty/Ethics In Professions, (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx. 
70. See Generally Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort Reform: A 
Reassessment and Reality Check, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 190 (2001). 
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makes it very tempting for attorneys to be less than forthcoming with the 
reality of the plaintiff's case.  Perhaps the plaintiff's case is simple and a 
sure winner.  An attorney may suggest a contingency fee knowing that he 
will have a big payday, when the client may have been able to afford his 
hourly rate.71  This, of course is unscrupulous and unethical, but it illustrates 
that contingency fees may allow lawyers to further take advantage of a tort 
victim who is in need. 
 
C. Comparison to Third-Party Litigation Financing 
 
Third-party litigation financing may offer plaintiffs an alternative to 
contingency fee agreements that will be much more advantageous for them.  
Third-party financing allows the plaintiff to hire a lawyer on an hourly rate 
basis.  This means the pitfalls of the contingency fee are evaded and justice 
may be better served.  Contingency fees leave an incongruent amount of 
power in the hands of lawyers as they are the more sophisticated and 
experienced party between themselves and the client, and they possess 
much greater bargaining power.  Moreover, a poorer plaintiff has no choice; 
either he agrees to the contingency fee arrangement, or he has no channel 
through which to pursue his claim.  By allowing plaintiffs third-party 
financing, a choice emerges.  This acts to equalize the power differential 
between lawyer and client.  Ultimately, the plaintiff can keep more of what 
he is owed and not be forced into a contingency fee ultimatum. 
Personal injury lawyers, and others, will perhaps be uninterested in 
working for an hourly rate as that arrangement does not allow them to make 
the huge windfalls contingency fees offer.  If third-party litigation financing 
gains a greater foothold, and poorer clients are given greater choices, the 
justice system will benefit.  The justice system should be about justice, not 
making lawyers rich.  Having greater choice gives the consumer more 
power, which germinates a more equal and fair legal system and ultimately 
a more equal and fair society. 
 
D. An Illustrative Vignette: Contingency Fee v. Third Party Litigation 
Financing 
 
The following scenario is a simple, yet explanatory narrative that 
demonstrates the issue with contingency fee agreements and the 
improvement third-party litigation financing could introduce into the 
American litigation landscape. 
Peter Plaintiff is a 42-year-old sushi chef with two children and a 
mortgage.  One morning, Peter retrieved his BrandCo ladder from his 
 
71. Id. 
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garage to clean the leaves from his gutters.  While on the ladder, a design 
flaw caused Peter to fall from a height of 15 feet.  He shattered his left arm 
and required several surgeries to make his arm functional again.  However, 
he never regained full use of his arm and can no longer perform his duties 
as a sushi chef.  After six months of recovery, Peter was rehired at the 
restaurant, but he was relegated to dishwasher and received a significant 
pay cut. 
BrandCo knew that their ladders were unsafe; they had discovered 
the design flaw two years before but did not issue a recall or take any other 
remedial measures.  This fact was quickly and easily discoverable through 
BrandCo's internal documents.  Peter secured Lenny Lawyer as his counsel.  
The case went to trial and Peter won; the court entered a judgement of 
$1,000,000. 
When Peter was looking for a lawyer, he had very little money.  
Between surgeries, being unable to work, getting demoted, and still having 
to pay the expenses of life, Peter had wiped out his savings and had no 
friends or family willing or able to advance him money to secure a lawyer.  
Lenny offered to take Peter’s case and offered a contingency fee agreement 
by which Lenny would get forty percent of any judgment Peter won if the 
case went to trial.  Peter was shocked at the percentage, but Lenny explained 
that he was taking all the risk; if Peter lost, Lenny would be out tens of 
thousands of dollars for his work.   
Still unsure, Peter tried to negotiate the percentage down to twenty 
percent.  Lenny refused and told Peter it would be forty percent, or he would 
not take Peter's case.  Lenny defied Peter to find any lawyer in town who 
would take his case for anything less than forty percent.  Peter, unfamiliar 
with legal costs or practices, agreed to Lenny's terms.  
Of the $1,000,000, Peter actually received $500,000 after all the 
legal costs and Lenny's fees were paid.  Lenny worked for roughly two 
hundred hours on the case; his normal hourly rate is $200 per hour.  Instead 
of the $40,000 Lenny would have received for his work, he received more 
than ten times that amount.72  It is clear that Lenny received a great windfall 
 
72. It may be argued the very existence of the contingency fee scheme depends 
on the possibility of attorneys receiving such windfalls.  Homerun wins (in which the 
attorney earns large sums) allow him to take on other cases with higher risk or lower 
proceeds.  However, the addition of a third party gives attorneys the ability to create 
more consistency in their income.  Rather than chase the homerun, attorneys would be 
free to charge hourly rates for their work or agree upon a flat fee for the claim.  
Contingency fees and hourly rates offer attorneys different benefits and risk.  Third-party 
financing may better incentivize attorneys to work on hourly rates, which in many cases 
will advantage the plaintiff as he receives a greater portion of the proceeds he needs to 
cope with his injury. 
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on the back of Peter's misery.  Peter, meanwhile, is left with less money to 
cope with his permanent disability. 
Suppose instead of entering into a contingency fee agreement with 
Lenny, Peter received funding from TP Finance Company to pursue his 
case.  Peter still finds Lenny and tells him that he would like to hire him on 
an hourly basis.  TP and Lenny confer, and Lenny estimates he will need to 
spend 200 hours on the case and that his hourly rate is $200 per hour.  On 
this information, TP loans Peter $50,000 to pursue his claim and pay his 
living expense in the meantime.  The terms of the contract with TP are that 
Peter will pay 50% interest on the loan if he recovers and will not have to 
repay the loan at all if he loses. 
When Peter wins, Lenny has already been paid as Peter has used the 
loan to pay Lenny's hourly rate as Lenny worked on the case.  Peter will 
need to repay his loan, plus $25,000 in interest.  After all associated costs 
are paid including the loan and interest, Peter nets $850,000.  In this 
situation, Lenny gets paid the rate he asked for,73 TP makes 50% interest 
on their loan, and most of the money goes to Peter – the victim of BrandCo's 
wrongdoing. 
The above illustration shows that justice may be better served if a 
worthy, but poor, plaintiff engages with a third-party financier rather than 
engaging directly with his attorney through a contingency fee agreement.  
Who loses out in this scenario?  Arguably, only the lawyer loses out on his 
potential massive windfall.  This is a loss the legal industry can bear in order 
to increase fairness and recovery for aggrieved plaintiffs.  
 
V. CREATING A RESPONSIBLE THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 
INDUSTRY 
 
A. Creating A New Category 
 
While third-party litigation financing can offer more and better 
options to plaintiffs, the industry must be regulated to ensure that it is the 
plaintiff, rather than financiers alone, who benefit most from the 
 
73. As a third-party financing industry develops, attorneys may be likely to raise 
their rates knowing that there is a large sum to be won.  This reality could threaten the 
objective of leaving more money in the pocket of the plaintiff.  However, choice is likely 
to diminish this effect.  A plaintiff can more easily shop for lawyers by simply 
comparing their hourly rates or flat fees rather than needing to calculate their potential 
costs.  As a result, lawyers will compete to have lower hourly rates.  Additionally, a 
plaintiff can weigh the choice for himself: agree to hourly rates or flat fees on his own, 
enter into a contingency agreement with an attorney, or enter into an agreement with a 
financier and hire an attorney at an hourly rate.  Each has its own risks and rewards, but 
the increase in choice for the plaintiff is the goal. 
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arrangement.  Third-party litigation financing is a relatively new 
phenomenon, emerging on the scene in the late 1990’s.74  The industry 
continues to grow, and states have taken different approaches to regulating 
the industry.75  Most state legislatures who have addressed litigation 
financing have enacted laws aimed at consumer protection.76  They might 
include the requirement that the financier be licensed and follow all the state 
laws associated with any other lender; in essence, litigation financing is 
treated like many other financial products.77 
Regulating litigation financing in the same manner as other loans is 
not the best approach.  Simply using the consumer protection laws in place 
is an inadequate means to managing the industry and protecting the 
plaintiff; this approach attempts to put a square peg in a round hole. 
Instead, this Article proposes that states carve out a unique space to 
allow for the existence of a healthy and responsible litigation finance 
industry.  Financiers cannot be treated simply as lenders because the roles 
and relationships involved are much more complicated.  The triangular 
relationship between the plaintiff, his counsel, and the financier is unlike 
anything that currently exists in the investment sphere. 
 
B. Consumer Protection 
 
Plaintiffs need the most protection in this complex relationship.  The 
current litigation finance industry has been pegged as an industry that has 
the potential to engage in predatory lending practices.78  It has been 
compared to payday lending in that clients may be desperate, 
unsophisticated, and vulnerable.79  These concerns can be addressed 
through simple regulations similar to those that are aimed at other 
borrowers. 
Transparency is an essential element to protect plaintiffs.  A non-
recourse structure should certainly be required to avoid indebting plaintiffs, 
 
74. Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2015 





77. State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry Financial Institutions 




78. Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another 
Form of Payday Lending?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2017). 
79. Id. 
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but plaintiffs also need to be informed of the true cost of borrowing money 
to engage in litigation.  Clear schedules should be enumerated in the 
agreements communicating to the plaintiff the amount to be repaid with 
honest schedules of how long a typical case of the sort takes to resolve. 
Monthly interest rates should be forbidden and sliding scale interest rates 
(based on time) should be the norm.  Further, all contracts between 
plaintiffs and financiers should conform to the regulations already in place 
under the Truth In Lending Act – a federal law created "to ensure that 
consumers are treated fairly by businesses in the lending marketplace and 
are informed about the true cost of credit."80  
One frequent criticism of third-party litigation financing is that it 
disadvantages the plaintiff by taking money out his (the victim’s) hand and 
putting it into the financier's hands.81  This is a fair criticism but is not unlike 
the relationship that already exists between attorneys and clients.  
Increasing access and shifting the burden of risk creates value for plaintiffs.  
If plaintiffs are accurately informed, they can make a measured decision 
whether or not to engage with a litigation financier.  Also, the scenarios 
above illustrate circumstances in which the plaintiff ends up with more of 
the judgement than they might with a contingency fee.  An added feature 
of a third-party litigation finance contract is that the attorney involved must 
work on an hourly rate rather than a contingency basis. 
 
C. Control and Duties 
 
Control over the case must remain with the plaintiff.  This is another 
level of protection that should be extended to consumers as the plaintiff 
should always be the master of his complaint.  Of course, financiers will 
want more control over the claim as they are the one footing the bill if the 
claim fails.  Financiers should be allowed to exert a level of influence over 
the plaintiff.  This can be in the form of information and suggested actions.  
 For instance, a financier can inform the plaintiff how much a case 
of the sort is typically worth, how long it usually takes to resolve, and 
suggest the client accept a settlement.  However, the plaintiff must not 
relinquish ultimate control; in other words, financiers cannot be given the 
power to settle a case without the plaintiff's permission.  The plaintiff 
should always have the final say.  Most current third-party litigation 
financing reserves such power to the plaintiff, but regulators must be sure 
to preserve the relationship as such.  This can help to ensure that the same 
 
80. Truth in Lending Act – Consumer Rights and Protections (2020) 
https://www.debt.org/credit/your-consumer-rights/truth-lending-act/ 
81. Herschkopf, supra note 4, at 1. 
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issues that exist in contingency fee arrangements (being quick to settle) do 
not manifest in the litigation finance industry. 
Financiers must also assume a role that is atypical for a lender; they 
must operate in the best faith possible.  Forces undoubtedly will lead 
financiers to seek quick and easy settlements if they are left to function as 
money-hungry lenders.  However, imposing a high duty of good faith will 
mean that financiers will have to look out for the best interest of the plaintiff 
or face consequences. 
Further, the doctrines of confidentiality and privilege must also 
extend to the financier-plaintiff relationship.82  As financiers will be privy 
to sensitive information, they must be sworn to the same confidentiality 
required for attorneys.83  Further, a financier's communication with the 
plaintiff or attorney and any work product of the financier must be protected 
as a privilege; the same as the attorney-client privilege.84 
These duties and privileges will allow financiers full access to the 
plaintiff's claim.  This will allow financiers to better evaluate the plaintiff's 
claim.  This allows the industry to develop its sophistication in navigating 
the courts and will ultimately benefit plaintiffs as financiers become 
savvier; this has the effect of balancing the scales between plaintiff and 
defendant.85  To facilitate this process, financiers must get accurate 
information from plaintiffs.  Thus, contracts must also include clauses 
holding the plaintiffs to full truth and transparency when presenting 
information to the financier that is considering whether or not to finance the 
case.86  
Continuing the quest for transparency, disclosures must be made by 
all parties engaged in finance litigation.  If a plaintiff is utilizing third-party 
financing, this must be disclosed to his attorney, the defense, and the 
court.87  This practice will help to clear any muddy waters surrounding the 
litigation.  An added advantage of this disclosure is that the defense may be 
more generous with settlement offers if they know the plaintiff is 
financially backed.  This is a signal to the defense that the plaintiff's claim 






82. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1328. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 1315. 
86. Id. at 1332. 
87. Id. at 1335. 
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D. Likely Outcomes 
 
In addition to the regulations proposed above, states must also 
abolish their champerty laws,88 or at least create an exception to allow the 
litigation finance industry to consistently develop in a healthy environment. 
The above proposed regulations may seem to impose a great deal of 
oversight onto litigation finance companies.  This is a good thing.  The 
industry has been battling a shady reputation since its inception and shining 
a light on it will be better for all.  If the industry is consistently regulated as 
a more legitimate one than it is now, the certainty can help it develop into 
a reputable resource for plaintiffs. 
Legislators should consider carving out a place for litigation 
financing and let the free market reign.  If the industry flourishes, then many 
plaintiffs will have much greater access to the civil litigation system.  If the 
industry fails, the landscape goes relatively unchanged and civil litigation 




Adding a responsible litigation financing industry to the American 
litigation scene could increase civil judicial access for many Americans 
who currently and historically lacked fair admission to the court system.  
Third-party litigation financing offers an additional avenue by which 
plaintiffs can pursue their claims.  More choice provides more opportunity 
for plaintiffs to find justice and for public interests to be advanced.  
Third-party litigation financing is an alternative to the traditional 
way in which poorer plaintiffs could gain access to civil litigation redress: 
contingency fees.  Third-party financing may be superior to contingency 
fees in that it can keep more money in the hands of the plaintiff. Also, third-
party financing allows access for plaintiffs whom a lawyer may not want to 
represent under a contingency fee agreement.  Adding more choices for 
plaintiffs will be a good thing as it puts more power in the hands of the 
aggrieved to control their claim, rather than having to submit to the few 
options currently available. 
Though the potential for positive impact is great, the industry must 
be sufficiently regulated to create a healthy, fair industry that protects 
consumers from potential misuse.  These regulations must include high 
levels of transparency, not threaten the power of the plaintiff to control his 
case and include a good faith responsibility from the financier to the client.  
These proposed changes likely have one, large, motivated group of 
opponents: those lawyers who currently operate on a contingency fee basis 
 
 88. See Steinitz, Id. at 1278. 
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and are the beneficiaries of massive windfalls.  The acceptance of a healthy 
third-party litigation finance industry could curb the disproportionate power 
that exists between plaintiffs and attorneys by redistributing risk and 
allowing more lawyers to work on an hourly basis, ultimately placing more 
power in the hands of the aggrieved: the plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
 
 
